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SOURCE: Survey of Household Finances (EFF).
a Households that have a debt/income ratio of over 300%, a debt/wealth ratio of over 75%, or who pay more than 40% of their income on loan interest and principal 
repayments.
b 'NTRDGNKCRVHSGBQDCHSBNMRSQ@HMSR@QDCDjMDC@RSGNRDVGNRDKN@M@OOKHB@SHNMG@RADDMO@QSKXNQETKKXQDIDBSDC
c This panel shows the elasticity of consumption to income. See J.M. Casado and M. Folch (2015) for further details.
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The financial situation of households, and particularly their level of 
indebtedness, can affect their spending decisions. The debt/
income ratio of Spanish households – a standard indebtedness 
indicator – rose significantly up to 2010 and has subsequently 
declined, also significantly. However, it remains high compared 
both with past periods of economic recovery and with other 
developed countries. This box analyses the implications for recent 
and future consumption patterns.
Panel 1 compares consumption patterns among different groups 
of households, according to their level of indebtedness, and 
shows that the most marked decline in consumption during the 
crisis was among the most highly indebted households. Further 
regressions to explain household level consumption growth on the 
basis of income, wealth and indebtedness levels confirm this 
inverse relationship between debt and spending.1
However, for a more in-depth analysis of the possible effects of the 
present indebtedness levels on Spanish household consumption 
(and, therefore, on the economic recovery momentum), a further 
angle must be included in the study, namely the behaviour of 
households that have no ability to save after debt servicing and 
that find it more difficult to access new credit. Panel 2, obtained 
from the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF), depicts the 
percentage of households whose annual spending is in excess of 
their income and the percentage of households that reported credit 
BOX 1.1HOUSEHOLD DEBT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMPTION
1  See Casado and Folch (2015) for more details on these findings. 
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constraints2 (as well as the percentage of households that 
simultaneously conform to both criteria). As may be observed, these 
figures are clearly higher for indebted households and they have 
risen during the crisis. For these households, consumption growth 
relies more on their current income than on possible expected 
increases in their future income, as these cannot be transformed into 
spending until they actually materialise. The above-mentioned 
regressions confirm this hypothesis and show that the consumption 
response to changes in (current) income rose during the crisis. 
Panel 3 depicts the estimates of this response for different groups of 
households, according to their level of indebtedness, and shows that 
higher consumption associated with higher income is most marked 
among the more highly indebted households.
Accordingly, the conclusion may be drawn that high indebtedness 
levels among Spanish households have adversely affected 
household consumption, which was to be expected, but at the 
same time that they have also rendered it more sensitive to 
changes in current income. This increased sensitivity of 
consumption to current income helps to explain the recent growing 
momentum in household consumption, in light of the clear 
recovery observed in household income. It also signals that, in this 
recovery phase, the improvement in employment could have a 
comparatively more positive effect on consumption than in 
comparable periods in the past. In any event it should also be 
recalled that the still-high level of indebtedness makes household 
demand more sensitive to changes in borrowing costs, although in 
the medium term a sharp rise in interest rates that could have a 
significantly contractionary effect on household spending levels is 
unlikely.
BOX 1.1HOUSEHOLD DEBT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMPTION (cont’d)
2  Defined as the proportion of households whose loan applications have 
been partly or fully rejected.
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The Spanish economy, on balance of payments data, again 
recorded net lending in 2014 (1.2% of GDP), although the level 
was lower than in 2013 (2.1%). This box identifies the variables 
that contributed to the slowdown in the improvement in the 
external balance in 2014, as well as the factors underlying its 
behaviour, in an attempt to determine the effects of the recent 
moderation on the external balance.
Both the current account balance and, to a much lesser extent, the 
capital account balance helped to reduce the external surplus last 
year (by 0.6 pp and by 0.3 pp of GDP, respectively). In relation to 
the current account, the component that caused the largest 
reduction in its balance (to 0.8% of GDP, from 1.4% the previous 
year) was the goods and services balance, the surplus of which 
shrank notably in 2014 (by 0.8 pp to 2.6% of GDP). In contrast, the 
primary and secondary income balances improved slightly (by 
0.2 pp, to -1.8% of GDP).
The deterioration of the goods and services balance was a result, 
in turn, of the reduction in the non-energy goods surplus, which 
was only partly mitigated by the improvement in the energy goods 
and services balances (see Panel 1). In particular, as regards 
goods trade, the sharp recovery in non-energy imports 
counteracted the growth in exports (see Panel 2), which continued 
to gain world market share, and the positive impact on the energy 
bill derived from the decline in the price of oil, which became more 
obvious by the end of the year.1 Accordingly, most of the reduction 
in the current surplus in 2014 was notably due to external 
purchases of non-energy goods, while exports continued to grow 
at a high rate.
The healthy performance of goods exports, which since the start 
of the crisis have grown at a faster rate than world demand and 
price competitiveness,2 reflects the impact of several 
developments that, together, would indicate that there has been a 
certain structural change in their behaviour. A simple way of 
illustrating this possible effect is to analyse whether the 
relationship between exports and their determinants has changed 
during the crisis. The historical relationship between these 
variables is therefore estimated for the period 1998-2008 and, on 
the basis of this estimate, the growth of exports is predicted for 
subsequent years using the observed path of world demand and 
the competitiveness of Spanish products.3 If the predicted path of 
exports is similar to the actual path then there would appear to 
have been no change in the relationship between this variable and 
its determinants.
As seen in Panel 3, exports have grown systematically at a faster rate 
than predicted by the estimated equation, which suggests that there 
have been significant changes in the historical relationship between 
external sales and their determinants. The geographical 
diversification of exports, the increase in the number of regular 
exporters (15.6% more than in 2008) and, also, the increasing 
internationalisation of SMEs would explain the improved performance 
of exports, in relation to their determinants, in the most recent period. 
Especially important, given the average small size of Spanish 
companies, is the increasing role of SMEs in recent export 
developments (see Panel 4). Without a doubt, the wage moderation 
that began in 2010, along with the consequent competitiveness 
gains,4 has facilitated the internationalisation of Spanish businesses 
and their penetration of increasingly competitive markets, since their 
lower costs have enabled Spanish firms to access markets in which 
prices were low in comparison with production costs in Spain. 
Against this backdrop of recovering cost competitiveness, the 
attractiveness of the Spanish economy as a destination for direct 
investment flows has increased, which has had a positive impact on 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the target firms. Thus, insofar 
as a large part of the competitive adjustment achieved in recent 
years has been of a structural nature, the level of exports can be 
expected to remain higher in future.
With regard to imports, as mentioned above, one of the most 
significant developments in 2014 was the sharp recovery in 
purchases of goods from abroad. In order to try to determine 
whether this surprisingly sharp increase was a consequence of a 
change in the historical relationship between imports and their 
determinants (basically final demand and competitiveness) or of 
the latter’s own behaviour, a similar exercise to the one described 
for exports was performed. On this occasion, the growth of total 
imports is observed to have been in line with that derived from the 
estimated prediction, so that there does not appear to have been 
any significant change in the historical relationship between 
purchases from abroad and their main determinants (see Panel 5).
A similar conclusion is reached for 2014 when this analysis is 
performed at a disaggregated level, except in the case of imports 
of non-energy intermediate goods,5 which continued to grow at a 
faster rate in 2014 than would have been expected on the basis of 
the behaviour of their main determinants, reflecting the dynamism 
of certain vertically integrated industries (e.g. the car industry).6 By 
contrast, the notable rise in consumer durables and capital goods 
imports is in keeping with the greater buoyancy displayed by these 
components in final demand (see Panel 6).
BOX 1.2DETERMINANTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF SPAIN’S EXTERNAL BALANCE IN 2014 AND THE OUTLOOK
1  The energy bill appears to have fallen by 5% in 2014 as a whole (0.2 pp 
of GDP). This decline reflects the impact of cheaper oil (8%), while the 
energy balance in real terms deteriorated by 2.7%. The decline in the oil 
price predicted for 2015 can be expected to reduce the energy bill 
further this year. On average, the energy bill falls by around 0.5% of 
nominal GDP for every €10 by which the price of a barrel of oil declines.
2  García, C. and E. Prades (2015), “Actualización de la función de 
exportaciones españolas de bienes”, Boletín Económico, April, Banco 
de España.
3  Specifically, the equation includes the variable that reflects the evolution 
of Spain’s export market and goods export and import deflators. In 
alternative specifications national demand is also included.
4  See Box 5, “Competitividad, costes laborales y empleo”, in Informe 
Trimestral de la Economía Española, Boletín Económico, December 
2014.
5  Energy imports declined, in nominal terms, in response to the fall in the 
price of oil.
6  See Box 5, “The recent behaviour of imports and their determinants”, 
Economic Bulletin, April 2014.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 109 ANNUAL REPORT, 2014 BOXES
BOX 1.2DETERMINANTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF SPAIN’S EXTERNAL BALANCE IN 2014 AND THE OUTLOOK (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España (based on Balance of Payments, CBA and mercantile registries statistics) and the AEAT (Spanish Tax Revenue Service) Customs and 
Excise Department.
a The energy and non-energy balances are estimates by the Banco de España drawing on Customs data.
b 3GDDWSDMRHUDL@QFHMHRCDjMDC@RSGDBNMSQHATSHNMSNSGDHMBQD@RDCDBQD@RD HMSGDDWONQSDCU@KTDCDQHUDCEQNL@MHMBQD@RDCDBQD@RD HMSGDMTLADQNE
fjQLBNTMSQXNECDRSHM@SHNMtSQ@CDQDK@SHNMR
c 3GDHMSDMRHUDL@QFHMHRCDjMDC@RSGDBNMSQHATSHNMSNSGDHMBQD@RDCDBQD@RDHMSGDDWONQSDCU@KTDCDQHUDCEQNL@MHMBQD@RDCDBQD@RDHMSGD@LNTMSDWONQSDC
AXD@BGjQLSND@BGBNTMSQX
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In any event, in the current stage of the cycle, spending is being 
directed towards goods with a high import content, which 
suggests that the effects of the changes in the composition of 
demand have been contributing to the recent growth in imports. 
The rise in capital goods imports (18.7% year-on-year in 2014 as 
a whole), linked to the recovery of investment and to the above-
mentioned growth in exports, reflects the dependence of Spanish 
industry on high value added imported inputs. Also notable in this 
respect is the vigorous growth of consumer durables imports 
(20% year-on-year in real terms), which may reflect a certain 
overreaction linked to the large cumulative fall in the consumption 
of such goods since the start of the crisis (-6.2% over the period 
2008-2013, as against –1.9% in the case of total spending). As for 
imports of non-durable consumer goods, with the firming of the 
recovery, a greater coincidence has been observed between 
actual purchases abroad and those predicted by the model, so 
that no significant substitution effect between domestic 
production and imports has yet been detected.
In conclusion, the improvement in the cyclical position of the Spanish 
economy, along with the realisation of purchase decisions that had 
been postponed during the crisis, appears to have had a significant 
impact on the external balance in 2014, having led to strong import 
growth. On the other hand, the fall in the price of oil, competitiveness 
developments and the expansion of the export base and its 
geographical diversification partly offset the negative impact of the 
cycle. In the future, while the business cycle will continue to support 
import growth, the impact of pent-up demand will ease over time. 
Moreover, despite the lack of evidence of a substitution effect on 
total imports, one would expect the gains in competitiveness arising 
from the still-ongoing internal devaluation, together with the changes 
in the productive structure, to be conducive to a reduction in import 
dependence in the medium term.7
BOX 1.2DETERMINANTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF SPAIN’S EXTERNAL BALANCE IN 2014 AND THE OUTLOOK (cont’d)
7  See Chapter 3 “Growth and reallocation of resources in the Spanish 
economy”, Annual Report, 2014, Banco de España.
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The Great Recession has highlighted the difficulties facing 
monetary policy when additional monetary stimulus measures are 
needed and policy rates are already close to their effective lower 
bound. In response to this challenge, monetary authorities have 
introduced various unconventional measures that seek to achieve 
financial conditions that are more likely to allow them to meet their 
targets. In particular, two types of instruments have been used. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 2 of the Spanish version of the 
Annual Report, regular use has been made of forward guidance,1 
a strategy that seeks to influence the formation of agents’ 
expectations, putting downward pressure on long-term interest 
rates and, therefore, affecting the slope of the yield curve. Second, 
central banks have resorted to purchasing public and private 
assets, in some cases on a large scale.
This box analyses the transmission channels through which these 
asset purchases operate and their effectiveness in a setting in 
which monetary policy has exhausted its conventional room for 
manoeuvre. For this purpose, the accompanying panels present 
various simulations made with a model calibrated for the euro 
area, one fundamental aspect of which is the existence of financial 
restrictions on the borrowing capacity of agents, and in particular 
of banks.2 The exercise considers a recession caused by 
turbulence originating in the financial sector – a decline in the 
quality of assets on banks’ balance sheets – that drives down both 
GDP and inflation, in the baseline scenario (the green line in the 
panels) by more than 6 and 3 pp, respectively.
This turbulence is transmitted to the economy through various 
channels. Initially, impairment of bank assets reduces the value of 
banks’ capital and raises their already high borrowing levels, 
forcing them to deleverage, selling assets at prices far short of their 
acquisition cost. These “fire sales” amplify the initial turbulence, 
driving asset prices down further, prompting additional balance 
sheet losses for banks and pushing up their financing costs which 
will subsequently be passed through to the cost of credit, with 
contractionary effects on productive investment, consumption 
and, in short, aggregate demand and activity. Moreover, these 
interactions display important feedback effects, as the deterioration 
in the economic outlook drives down asset prices yet again and 
further debilitates the financial situation of banks, heightening both 
the depth and the duration of the recession.
Typically, the conventional monetary policy response to this 
concatenation of events (the red line in the panels) would be to cut 
short-term interest rates sharply, partially offsetting the increase in 
financing costs and thus curbing the impact on aggregate demand. 
This would, in turn, mitigate the adverse negative amplifying effect 
that the decline in activity has on banks’ balance sheets. However, 
this hypothetical scenario is not feasible, since the monetary 
authority’s capacity to act may be restricted by the fact that 
interest rates are already at their effective lower bound, as is the 
case in this simulation just three quarters after the original 
turbulence. The existence of this curb on monetary policy’s 
countercyclical response exacerbates the increase in financing 
costs and depresses aggregate demand even further, generating a 
considerably deeper and more protracted recession. In accordance 
with the simulation (the green line in panels 3 and 4), in this 
baseline scenario GDP and inflation would fall 0.75% and 1  pp 
respectively more than if there was no effective lower bound, while 
financing costs would rise 1 pp more.
To overcome these hurdles, central banks have at their disposal 
other unconventional instruments, such as purchases of non-
financial private sector assets, if need be on a large scale. The blue 
line in the panels depicts an alternative scenario where the monetary 
authority launches a sufficiently large quantitative easing programme 
so as to approximately offset the adverse effect of the zero interest-
rate bound being reached.3 Such measures directly affect the prices 
of the assets purchased, and indirectly affect, through the subsequent 
portfolio reallocation process, the prices of other substitute assets, 
narrowing the spreads between them. The pass-through of the 
overall drop in yields to the cost of private sector borrowing cushions 
both the initial drop in aggregate demand and the amplifying effects 
arising from deleverage at the banks. In the exercise presented, an 
asset purchase programme equivalent to around 9% of GDP 
overcomes the drag on monetary policy’s countercyclical response 
that the existence of a lower bound on short-term interest rates 
entails, allowing GDP and inflation to behave as if conventional 
monetary policy were not subject to the zero lower bound (the red 
line). Despite the uncertainty as to the calibration of a simplified 
model such as this, the findings are consistent with the empirical 
evidence on the impact of a quantitative easing programme, 
available for the recent experience in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (see Table 1).
It is important to note that, owing to its necessarily simplified 
nature, the exercise does not include many aspects that may be 
relevant when it comes to assessing how effective the instrument 
is. Thus, for example, the model considered relates to a closed 
economy and, therefore, there is no consideration of the exchange 
rate channel, which may play a very important role in certain 
circumstances. In addition, other key aspects of the interaction 
BOX 2.1MONETARY POLICY WHEN POLICY RATES REACH THEIR EFFECTIVE LOWER BOUND
1  For a general discussion on how central banks have used forward 
guidance see, for example, M. Woodford  (2013), “Forward Guidance by 
Inflation-Targeting Central Banks”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 
3, pp.  81-120, presented at ‘Two Decades of Inflation Targeting,’ 
Sveriges Riksbank, 3 June 2013.
2  The macroeconomic model used is a version of the model developed in 
M. Gertler and P. Karadi (2011), “A model of unconventional monetary 
policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 58 (1), pp. 17-34.
3  The theoretical exercise envisages a programme of purchases of 
securities issued by private entities, whereas, in practice, the 
programmes launched by central banks, shaped by relative market size, 
have largely focused on purchases of public debt securities. This 
difference could qualify the scale of the impact of the quantitative easing 
shown here, since for a specific volume of purchases, the macroeconomic 
impact of purchases of public debt securities is smaller, as it is a deeper 
and more efficient market (see M. Gertler and P. Karadi, 2013, “QE1 vs. 2 
vs.  3: A Framework to Analyze Large Scale Asset Purchases as a 
Monetary Policy Tool”, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9, 
pp. 5-53).
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with other economic policies, such as fiscal policy, are excluded, 
as is the fact that the financial structure of an economy – 
understood as the financing and investment instruments available, 
financial intermediaries and relations between them – is too 
complex to be fully covered by the model. Nevertheless, the 
quantitative exercise clearly illustrates the potential effectiveness 
of the large-scale asset purchase programmes that the main 
central banks, and in particular most recently the ECB, have 
implemented since 2008, once they had exhausted their respective 
room for manoeuvre in terms of conventional measures.
BOX 2.1MONETARY POLICY WHEN POLICY RATES REACH THEIR EFFECTIVE LOWER BOUND (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Based on V. Constâncio (2015), presentation at the 2015 US Monetary Policy Forum, Panel discussion on Central Banking with Large Balance Sheets. To enhance 
SGDBNLO@Q@AHKHSX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DWOQDRRDC@R@ODQBDMS@FD
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This box analyses the possible repercussions on the main 
macroeconomic variables of both the euro area and the United 
States of various  monetary  policy  tightening scenarios in the 
United States, based on simulations made using the global NiGEM 
model.1 These simulations present different paths for short-term 
interest rates in the period 2015-16. The main macroeconomic 
effects are transmitted through some of the channels described in 
Chapter 2 of the Spanish version of the Annual Report: the 
exchange rate (which in the simulations is based on uncovered 
short-term interest rate parity), long-term interest rates and 
multilateral trade.
By way of illustration, in the baseline scenario, interest rates 
behave in accordance with the expectations being factored in by 
futures markets in early March 2015, i.e. that short-term rates in 
the United States would start to rise in 2015 Q3, increasing by 
more than 100 bp by end-2016, below the figure projected by the 
FOMC following its December 2014 meeting. Long-term rates 
would also start to rise in Q3, but at a slower pace, by just 40 bp, 
resulting in a flatter yield curve. In the euro area, the short-term 
rate would remain at zero throughout the simulation period in all 
the scenarios, while the German long-term rate would rise by 
25 bp by end-2016. For all other euro area countries, it is assumed 
that the sovereign spreads with Germany would be maintained, 
meaning that the degree of financial fragmentation of the euro area 
would remain unchanged.
This box analyses three alternative scenarios. The first two draw 
on two previous episodes of monetary tightening in the United 
States (1994-95 and 2004-06), which coincided in both cases with 
periods when there were cyclical divergences among the 
developed economies and also marked differences in the 
behaviour of financial markets. In both scenarios it is assumed 
that short-term rates in the United States will be in line with the 
projections of the FOMC, which point to an increase of more than 
BOX 2.2IMPACT ON THE EURO AREA ECONOMY OF MONETARY TIGHTENING IN THE UNITED STATES
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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1  NiGEM is an estimated quarterly macroeconometric model, which 
includes standard relationships between the different economic 
variables. It is a global model covering, with a varying degree of detail, 
some 60 countries or geographical areas and the interactions between 
them. For more information on the main characteristics of NiGEM see: 
http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk.
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200  bp, entailing greater tightening than that discounted in the 
baseline scenario.
In the first scenario there is also a higher increase in long-term 
rates, in accordance with the pattern seen after the US recession 
of the early 1990s. In February 1994 good macroeconomic data 
prompted the Federal Reserve to make surprise rate increases, 
embarking on a monetary tightening cycle. This move was 
accompanied by an increase in long-term rates, higher asset price 
volatility and heavy losses for market participants owing to their 
excessive leverage. The international repercussions were also 
unexpected and far-reaching, as bond yields rose in the United 
Kingdom, Japan and the euro area member countries. At that time 
most of those economies were at the initial recovery stage, there 
was no sign of inflation and monetary policies were expansionary. 
Compared with the baseline scenario, short-term rates in the 
United States would be 80 bp higher and long-term rates more 
than 200 bp higher at end-2016, reflecting a gradual increase in 
the term premium (see Panel 1).
In the case of the euro area (see Panel 2), short-term rates would 
remain at zero, as there is no room for more expansionary 
monetary policy using conventional measures, but long-term 
rates would increase by slightly more than 100 bp compared with 
the baseline scenario, assuming, in keeping with historical 
evidence,2 that 50% of the increase in long-term rates in the 
United States would pass through. This assumption regarding the 
pass-through rate is, in any event, disputable in the present 
circumstances. The fact that official interest rates in the euro area 
have reached their zero lower bound could make long-term rates 
more sensitive than in the past. Conversely, with the launch of the 
securities purchase programme, the Eurosystem could influence 
the long end of the yield curve, neutralising the effect of monetary 
tightening in the United States.3
Panels 3 and 4 trace the impact of this scenario on growth and 
inflation in the United States and in the euro area. As was to be 
expected, monetary policy tightening has an adverse effect on 
both variables in both areas. Beyond the specific quantitative 
effect, which seems rather high in view of the findings using other 
models, it is noteworthy that the impact is much greater in the 
United States than in the euro area, which would help to smooth 
out the cyclical differences between the two economies.
In the second scenario there is no increase in the term premium, 
in keeping with what was named the “conundrum” in the period 
2004-06, which was the last time that interest rates were raised in 
the United States. Between June 2004 and June 2006 the official 
interest rate was increased to smooth the strong economic 
momentum and high inflation. The extraordinary nature of this 
period was that long-term government bond yields remained 
virtually unchanged. During this period there were also cyclical 
differences between the US economy and the other developed 
economies, but there was no financial contagion or heightened 
market volatility. Europe and Japan were both in a downturn, 
monetary policy remained expansionary and long-term rates 
continued to head downward, not responding to the monetary 
tightening in the United States. Among the factors cited as a 
possible explanation for this are the greater credibility of the Fed 
reducing the macroeconomic risk and the growth in savings in 
emerging countries which drove up the demand for safe assets. In 
consequence, long-term interest rates would increase by less 
than 100 bp compared with the baseline scenario in the United 
States, and by approximately 60 bp in the euro area (see Panels 1 
and 2). As increases in long-term interest rates are lower in both 
areas, the effects on growth and inflation are also negative, albeit 
less so (see Panels 3 and 4). Naturally, they are still higher in the 
United States, so the cyclical differences are corrected in this 
case also.
The third scenario envisages the possibility that the launch of the 
ECB’s securities purchase programme will immunise the euro area 
from the increase in long-term interest rates in the United States. 
Accordingly, this scenario repeats the second scenario, but with 
euro area interest rates as in the baseline scenario. Panels 3 and 4 
show that the impact of this third scenario on the US economy is 
largely similar to that of the second scenario; however, in the case 
of the euro area, GDP is practically unchanged on the baseline 
scenario and inflation is even slightly higher, as the exchange rate 
depreciation effect predominates, so this would be an additional 
boost for achievement of the ECB’s goal.
To conclude, the exercise shows how monetary tightening in the 
United States could have a significant impact on economic activity 
in the euro area. Although this would help to smooth out the 
cyclical differences between the two areas, it would be at the cost 
of lower growth. The main effects are channelled through the 
increase in long-term interest rates in the United States and the 
pass-through to long-term interest rates in the euro area. In both 
cases there is considerable uncertainty regarding the scale of 
these effects. In the case of the euro area, although there is no 
scope for a more expansionary conventional monetary policy, the 
securities purchase programme launched by the Eurosystem 
could mitigate the effect on long-term interest rates. It is difficult to 
include these aspects in the analytical framework considered, but 
they highlight the need for the ECB Governing Council to remain 
alert, in view of the possibility of undesirable episodes of spillover 
of US interest rate rises.
BOX 2.2IMPACT ON THE EURO AREA ECONOMY OF MONETARY TIGHTENING IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
2  See, for example, S. Gilchrist, V. Yue and E. Zakrajsek (2014), “U.S. 
Monetary Policy and Foreign Bond Yields”, presented at the IMF’s 15th 
Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference; and also S. Arslanalp and 
Y. Chen (2014), “U.S. Interest Rates: The Potential Shock Heard Around 
the World”, http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/05/21/u-s-interest-rates- 
the-potential-shock-heard-around-the-world/.
3  The IMF’s April 2015 “Global Financial Stability Report” presents some 
evidence to support the view that the causal relationships between US 
and euro area interest rates may have changed since the ECB announced 
its securities purchase programme.
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The degree of competition is a fundamental determinant of an 
economy’s productive structure and may affect its sectoral 
composition and the effective allocation of resources among firms 
in each sector. Regulation is one factor that can influence the 
degree of sectoral competition. Indeed, in some cases regulation 
is justified precisely as a means of bringing competition to markets 
that could intrinsically be oligopolies.1 However, excess or, in 
general, inappropriate regulation can be a barrier to entry for 
competitors or can permit collusion between established firms, 
boosting profit margins and reducing output and efficiency.
This box aims to show how regulatory changes may have affected 
the degree of efficiency of the intra-sectoral reallocation of 
resources, based on the analysis of a specific sector, namely 
Spanish retail trade. This is a highly important sector, owing not 
only to its share of GVA (6.7%) and employment (13.4%), in both 
cases in terms of the market economy, but also to the role the 
distribution channels play in productivity and price formation. 
Regulation of retail trade is extensive and complex and has 
traditionally posed numerous barriers to competition. In Spain, 
powers over domestic trade are devolved to the regions, which are 
responsible for regulating retail trade, although the central 
government has the power to establish basic general rules. As a 
result, sector regulations vary significantly from region to region. 
These differences and how they have evolved can be illustrated by 
building synthetic regulation indicators by region.2
As shown in Panel 1, which aggregates the synthetic regulation 
indicators of the regions, weighted by population, 1999 saw the 
start of a period of intense regulatory activity in the retail trade 
sector, with the regional authorities, in an endeavour to protect 
traditional retailers, introducing increasingly stringent regulations. 
Restrictions – moratoria – were set on new openings3 and second 
trading licences were required of ever smaller retailers and even of 
hard discount stores,4 pitching them in together for that purpose 
BOX 3.1ECONOMIC REGULATION AND INTRA-SECTORAL REALLOCATION: RETAIL TRADE
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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1  Aside of regulation, there are demand conditions and cost structures 
that would lead to natural differences in the degree of competition 
between sectors.
2  See Matea and Mora (2012), “El comercio minorista y regulación autonómica: 
efectos en la densidad comercial, el empleo y la inflación”, Revista de 
Economía Aplicada, no.  59, vol.  XX, pp.  5-54. In that article, synthetic 
indicators are built reflecting a series of legislative aspects of the sector, 
aggregated using the factorial analysis method. These are, specifically, 
regulation on Sunday and public holiday trading, weekly opening hours, 
sales periods, taxes on large retail outlets, moratoria on new openings, the 
definition of large retail outlet which entails the need for a regional licence 
(save in Madrid in recent years) and the need for a regional licence for hard 
discount stores. By design, these indicators take values between 0 (no 
regulation) and 10 (maximum regulation). Evidence is found to show that 
greater regulation of retail trade in Spain is associated with higher inflation, 
lower employment in the sector and higher retail density.
3  A ban on new openings of large retail outlets in a specific region in a 
given period.
4  The definition of hard discount stores varies somewhat from region to 
region but is based on a minimum number of own (private label) brand 
products on sale and a minimum number of stores of the same size 
trading under the same name.
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BOX 3.1ECONOMIC REGULATION AND INTRA-SECTORAL REALLOCATION: RETAIL TRADE (cont’d)
with large retail outlets. Also during the period, a special tax on 
large retail outlets was first introduced in some regions. This 
regulatory surge peaked in 2005 when opening hours were 
reduced (in terms of Sunday and public holiday trading and 
maximum opening hours per week), with the brunt of these 
regulations borne by the large outlets.
However, in 2009, some regions started to adopt measures 
ahead of the transposition of the Services Directive in March 
2010 and the regulatory surge was brought to a halt. The 
Services Directive marked a turning point, as from then on 
barriers to competition were gradually eliminated or at least 
lowered. Specifically, although large retail outlets still need a 
regional licence (except in Madrid), most authorities have raised 
the threshold for stores to be considered large outlets, 
withdrawn the specific licence for hard discount stores and 
removed the moratoria on new openings. In addition, the 
administrative procedures for opening small stores have been 
simplified and the restrictions on opening hours and sales 
periods have been eased. The criteria to be met to be deemed 
a “major tourist area”5 have also been relaxed, meaning that 
more areas now have unlimited opening hours. More recently, in 
2013 and 2014, the rules on opening hours and sales periods 
were further relaxed.
The impact of these regulatory changes on sector efficiency may 
be approximated by the relationship between the regulation 
indicator described above and various efficiency measures (see 
section 4 of this chapter). Based on the information supplied by 
the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO), Panel 1 depicts the 
aforementioned regulation indicator together with a sector 
efficiency indicator calculated as the covariance between the 
share of employment of the retail sector firms and their labour 
productivity relative to the sector average. The higher the value of 
the indicator, the higher the proportion of employment concentrated 
in the most productive firms and, in consequence, the better the 
allocation of employment among the sector firms. The relationship 
between the two indicators shows, broadly speaking, that more 
(less) stringent legislation is associated with lower (higher) 
aggregate sector productivity. Specifically, it is observed that 
when regulation was most stringent (between 1997 and 2001) the 
allocation of employment was increasingly inefficient; 
subsequently, when regulation eased (between 2008 and 2012) 
the allocation of employment became more efficient. A similar 
message can be drawn from the relationship between the 
regulation indicator and a measure of sectoral momentum such as 
business demography (entry and exit rates of retail trade firms; see 
Panel 2) which traces a continuous downward pattern until 2005, 
holds steady until 2010 and then turns upward.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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5  Major tourist areas may be municipalities or areas of municipalities that 
meet at least one of the following criteria: a) have sufficient concentration 
of tourist accommodation or second homes; b)  are declared a world 
heritage site or house a site or building of cultural interest; c) border on 
or consist of areas of influence of border zones; d) host certain national 
or international sporting or cultural events; e) are close to tourist cruise 
ports; f)  are key shopping tourism areas; g)  meet other criteria that 
warrant their inclusion. These areas have unlimited opening hours. 6  This upturn continued throughout 2013 and 2014.
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In order to analyse the extent to which the different regulatory 
policies have determined the degree of sector efficiency, the 
regulatory differences from region to region over time are exploited 
to estimate the impact of different regulatory aspects on the first of 
the efficiency measures mentioned (see table).7 As can be seen, 
greater regulation, measured by the synthetic indicator, results in 
less efficient allocation of employment (equation 1).8 The adverse 
effect of stricter regulation is also observed in the relationship with 
each of the regulatory aspects separately (equations  2 to 8), 
although the taxes on large retail outlets, the moratoria on new 
openings and the licence for large retail outlets and hard discount 
stores have a lesser impact than aspects such as opening hours 
(Sunday and public holiday trading and opening hours per week) 
and sales periods.
In short, this analysis illustrates how economic regulation can 
affect economic efficiency. In the specific case of retail trade, 
the analysis performed confirms that transposition of the 
Services Directive and other recent measures adopted relating 
to opening hours and sales periods has boosted productivity in 
the sector.
BOX 3.1ECONOMIC REGULATION AND INTRA-SECTORAL REALLOCATION: RETAIL TRADE (cont’d)
7  This exercise cannot be conducted with entry and exit rates of firms as 
these rates are not available for the sector by region.
8  The regression made includes annual dummy variables to prevent 
temporary factors, such as the crisis, which should affect all regions equally, 
from being confused with the regulation effect. In this respect, the regulation 
difference by region is being exploited. The findings also hold if regional 
dummy variables are included in the above equations, in this case to exploit 
the change over time of the covariance and regulation in each region.
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During the economic crisis, certain employment segments bore 
the brunt of job destruction. In particular, approximately 60% of all 
jobs lost since 2008 are in the construction sector, which 
accounted for 5.7% of total employment in 2014, down from 12% 
in 2008. It is important to analyse how construction workers have 
been affected, not only because of the scale of the job losses in 
the sector but also because of the workers’ particular 
characteristics,1 such as their lower skill levels, which could, a 
priori, make them less employable in other sectors, even against a 
backdrop of economic recovery such as that envisaged for Spain 
in the coming years.
It is possible to analyse the employment situation of construction 
workers who lost their jobs during the crisis using the social 
security administrative labour records (MCVL).2 Panel 1 traces the 
change, in the period 2007 to 2013, in the employment situation of 
construction workers who were employed in the sector at the start 
of 2007, according to whether they continue to work in the sector, 
found work in another sector or are unemployed. Panel 2 shows 
the same information for workers from the rest of the economy. As 
a result of the high level of job destruction, by 2009 less than 50% 
of construction workers were still in their jobs and by 2013 only 
17.6% were still employed in the industry. These figures are much 
lower than for the rest of the economy, where almost 50% of 
workers continued to be employed in the same sector throughout 
the period.
Moreover, the percentage of workers who found jobs in a different 
sector is relatively low. Specifically, only 22.9% of those employed 
in the construction sector at the start of 2007 were working in 
other industries in 2013, which is 27.8% of those who lost their 
jobs in construction, compared with 40% for those who lost their 
jobs in other industries in the period. Analysing the sectors in 
which workers found employment, Panel 3 shows that more 
former construction workers than those from other sectors found 
jobs in manufacturing and in certain service industries, such as 
transport, trade or hotels and catering, reflecting a greater 
similarity between the skills required in these industries and the 
skills offered by former construction workers. Conversely, 
significantly fewer former construction workers than workers from 
the rest of the economy found jobs in financial services, healthcare 
or education. As regards geographical mobility, 18.9% of 
construction workers who found employment in other industries 
did so in a different province than where they were working in 
2007, which would indicate greater labour mobility than in other 
sectors (13.2%).
In order to identify the characteristics of construction workers 
that may explain the problems involved in their sectoral 
reallocation, Table 1 analyses the effect of certain personal 
characteristics on the likelihood of finding oneself unemployed, 
employed in the same sector or employed in another sector, 
drawing a distinction between workers who were employed in 
construction at the onset of the crisis and those who were 
employed in the rest of the economy. The table shows that older, 
less-skilled workers with more years of service have had 
particular difficulties finding other work, which probably reflects 
their higher level of firm-specific human capital and the greater 
obstacles they face to achieve professional re-training. 
Specifically, younger workers are less likely to be unemployed, 
which is because they are more employable in other sectors, 
since the likelihood of their remaining in the construction industry 
is similar to that observed among older workers. By skill level, 
construction workers with higher skill levels are less likely to be 
unemployed, because more of them keep their jobs in 
construction and because it is also easier for them to find jobs in 
other sectors. Workers with fewer years of service at the onset of 
the crisis were more likely to lose their jobs and are more likely to 
be unemployed in 2013. However, they are also more likely to 
have found work in other sectors than workers who had more 
years of experience at the start of the crisis.
This sectoral reallocation process may be analysed further by 
examining the wages received3 by these workers in 2013. Table 
2 shows how median wages evolved between 2007 and 2013, 
according to the sector of employment during that time. Among 
workers who remained in the construction industry, wage 
adjustment was not consistent with the severity of the crisis in 
the industry, since wages remained steady in real terms (0.3%). 
Indeed, workers with higher skill levels saw their wages grow by 
3.3% in cumulative terms, similar to the wage rise observed in 
the rest of the economy, although the increase in real terms in 
less-skilled workers’ wages was lower than in the rest of the 
economy.
Among workers who found jobs in other sectors, former 
construction workers experienced a significant wage adjustment 
in real terms (10.6% less than in 2007) that is not observed 
among other workers. The drop in wages was most severe 
among less-skilled workers with fewer years’ experience, which 
would reflect, among other factors, the loss of firm-specific 
human capital by former construction workers who found jobs in 
other industries. This wage adjustment could approximate the 
cost, in terms of loss of productivity, associated with the sectoral 
reallocation process.
BOX 3.2SECTORAL REALLOCATION OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS FORMERLY EMPLOYED IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
1  According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), compared with the 
unemployed from other sectors, they have more years of service and 
lower skill levels, they have had less ongoing training and they have 
been mostly employed in low-skilled posts.
2  For a description of this database, see S. Galán and S. Puente (2015), 
“Minimum Wages: Do They Really Hurt Young People?” in The B.E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 15 (1), pp. 299-328.
3  The social security administrative labour records (MCVL) contain 
information on reported contribution bases which approximate the 
wages received by workers, save for those whose wages exceed the 
maximum contribution base. The calculations presented are not affected 
by the exclusion of these workers from the analysis.
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BOX 3.2SECTORAL REALLOCATION OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS FORMERLY EMPLOYED IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
(cont’d)
SOURCES: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
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In short, the above analysis shows that the process of sectoral 
reallocation of construction workers who have lost their jobs 
since the onset of the crisis is far from over, as the proportion 
of workers having found employment in other sectors is still 
relatively low. Moreover, this is proving to be a particularly 
costly process for certain groups, such as older and less-
skilled workers, who may be less employable in other sectors. 
Active employment policies should focus on providing these 
groups of workers with the skills needed in other sectors of the 
economy.
BOX 3.2SECTORAL REALLOCATION OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS FORMERLY EMPLOYED IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
(cont’d)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 121 ANNUAL REPORT, 2014 BOXES
This box analyses the potential macroeconomic impact of a 
persistently very low-inflation environment arising from a 
contraction of aggregate demand aggravated by a possible 
disanchoring of long-term inflation expectations. Similarly, the role 
that various economic policies may play to mitigate the 
contractionary effects of this environment is assessed. To this end, 
several scenarios are presented which are constructed from a 
general equilibrium model developed by Arce, Hurtado and Thomas 
(2015)1 and designed to include certain key features of the Spanish 
economy as it is at present. This model includes two regions within 
a monetary union with the aim of showing some of the most 
significant differences between the macroeconomic environment 
of those countries in the euro area which have experienced greater 
financial strains during the crisis (region A, in terms of the model), 
compared with other countries which were less affected in this 
episode (region B)2. An essential differentiating feature between the 
two regions is that in region A there is a financial shock which gives 
rise to a gradual and lasting private-sector deleveraging process.
The first of the following scenarios illustrates the contractionary 
effect which may be produced by some disanchoring of long-term 
inflation expectations in a setting in which interest rates have 
reached their effective lower bound. Taking this as a starting point, 
in the second scenario, the individual effects of the following are 
analysed: using non-standard monetary policy measures aimed at 
reducing expected medium-term interest rates; structural reforms 
in product and labour markets; and an expansionary fiscal policy 
in the region of the monetary union which is not undergoing 
private-sector deleveraging (region B).3 Finally, the effects of 
applying these policies simultaneously and possible synergies 
between them are analysed4.
Panel 1 shows a scenario in which the deleveraging process in 
region A occurs in tandem with a sharp contraction of aggregate 
demand across the area, triggered by a fall in households’ 
propensity to consume, which is similar to that which would be 
prompted, for example, by an increase in aggregate uncertainty. 
This shock is sufficiently intense for the central bank to hold its 
interest rates at the lower bound for a year, from which the 
recovery in inflation in the area as a whole leads it to set positive 
rates again (blue line). A disanchoring of long-term inflation 
expectations, which under normal circumstances would involve a 
very moderate real impact – insofar as the central bank would 
reduce nominal interest rates in order to avoid an increase in real 
rates – may be particularly contractionary when it occurs once 
interest rates are already at their lower bound. Specifically, the 
restriction imposed by the lower bound of nominal interest rates, 
together with abnormally low inflation expectations, results in the 
short term in lower inflation and in higher real interest rates in 
relation to the scenario without the disanchoring of expectations. 
The combination of these two factors triggers additional negative 
effects on economic activity which are particularly intense in the 
region which is reducing its indebtedness (red line).
Panel 2 includes the marginal effect (with respect to the previous 
scenario and with the disanchoring of expectations) produced by 
the implementation of: (i)  non-standard monetary policy which 
induces a decline in the expected path of future interest rates 
(green line); (ii) structural reforms in product and labour markets in 
region A (blue line), and (iii) temporary fiscal expansion in region B 
(red line)5. First, a monetary policy measure which puts downward 
pressure on the path of expected nominal interest rates triggers an 
increase in GDP in the area as a whole6, due to a reduction in 
expected real interest rates. Second, as a natural outcome of the 
higher degree of competition and efficiency of the product and 
labour markets, structural reforms in region A generate a positive 
impact on the competitiveness of these markets which prompts a 
significant increase in this region’s exports, in employment (which 
grows as a result of wage moderation and the increase in external 
demand) and in future growth expectations. The foregoing gives 
rise to more buoyant activity in the short term. Finally, a fiscal 
stimulus in the region least affected by the crisis (region  B) 
produces, albeit with a certain lag, clearly positive effects on the 
activity elsewhere in the area through exports and also through the 
consequent positive effect on inflation, which reduces real interest 
rates and erodes the real value of the debt.
BOX 4.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF A LOW-INFLATION SCENARIO AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
1  O. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2015), Policies for a low-inflation 
environment in a monetary union, Documentos de Trabajo de Banco de 
España (forthcoming). See also J. Andrés, O. Arce and C. Thomas 
(2014), Structural reforms in a debt overhang, Documentos de Trabajo, 
No. 1421, Banco de España.
2  Although the model incorporates a broad set of realistic elements, its 
calibration is not designed to reproduce quantitative responses by the 
variables that may be interpreted from an empirical perspective. 
Accordingly, the magnitudes in the exercises presented below are 
merely illustrative of the qualitative behaviour of the key channels and 
variables in the model.
3  The aim of using expansionary fiscal policy is to illustrate the theoretical 
effect of measures such as those recommended recently in different 
circles to attempt to stimulate activity in the euro area as a whole, using 
in this connection the fiscal capacity of those economies in a more 
comfortable public finances position. See, for example, International 
Monetary Fund (2014), “Is it time for an infrastructure push? The 
macroeconomic effects of public investment”, World Economic Outlook, 
Chapter 3, October.
4  The idea about the possible existence of synergies between the types of 
policies analysed here is implicit, for example, in President Draghi’s 
introductory statement following the ECB Governing Council meeting of 
15 April 2015.
5  In the context of the model, the product market reform comprises a 
permanent reduction in mark-ups set by companies. In a symmetrical 
manner, the labour market reform involves a decrease in the margin 
between the wage earned by employees and their reservation wage, 
together with a greater degree of flexibility in the adjustment of nominal 
wages. The fiscal expansion in region B is instrumented by increasing 
the level of public spending, which will gradually decrease in terms of 
size following the implementation of the fiscal expansion.
6  For a recent analysis of the impact of this type of policies in the 
context of a closed economy (with an independent monetary policy), 
see P.  Benigno, G. Eggertsson and F. Romei (2014), Dynamic debt 
deleveraging and optimal monetary policy, NBER Working Paper 
No. 20556.
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BOX 4.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF A LOW-INFLATION SCENARIO AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICIES 
(cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Variable presented as a level (not as a deviation from initial scenario).
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With the aim of analysing the possible synergies between the three 
measures above, Panel 3 represents their marginal effects in two 
alternative scenarios. In the first scenario (red line), the marginal 
effects described in the previous paragraph are added together, 
that is to say, those effects arising from implementing each 
measure separately. In the second scenario (blue line), the marginal 
effects of applying jointly structural reforms in region  A and 
temporary fiscal expansion in region B are calculated, in a setting 
in which the central bank also applies non-standard monetary 
policy such as that considered in this box. The main result of this 
exercise is that the joint implementation of structural reforms (in 
the region that suffers the crisis more directly), counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies (in the region with margin to do so) and non-standard 
monetary policy measures produces considerably higher 
expansionary effects in the short term than those which could be 
obtained if these policies were applied separately.
BOX 4.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF A LOW-INFLATION SCENARIO AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICIES 
(cont’d)
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In the second half of 2014, oil prices decreased considerably from 
levels of more than $110 (€80) per barrel in June 2014 to lows in 
January 2015 of slightly more than $45 (€40) per barrel, and have 
risen moderately since then. This box quantifies, first, the impact 
of these changes in oil prices on some of the main macro 
magnitudes of the Spanish economy, using the Quarterly 
Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE by its 
Spanish abbreviation)1. Second, it analyses in depth the interplay 
between a persistent decrease in oil prices and some of the 
specific conditioning factors of the Spanish economy at present, 
such as the current situation of monetary policy, for which purpose 
the general dynamic equilibrium model of Arce, Hurtado and 
Thomas (2015)2 is used.
The direct impact of the fall in oil prices on consumer prices was 
felt rapidly, mainly via its pass-through to heating and vehicle fuel 
prices. As indicated in the main text of this report, the negative 
year-on-year rates of the CPI since July 2014 are essentially 
explained by the behaviour of fuel prices. Accordingly, it should be 
noted that, in Spain, the rate of indirect taxation levied on heating 
and vehicle fuels has a high fixed component, which amplifies the 
impact of changes in oil prices on the CPI when the starting point 
for these prices is a high level3.
According to the MTBE, which estimates both direct and indirect 
effects via their pass-through to the economy as a whole, a 
permanent unanticipated reduction in crude oil prices of 10%, at 
the beginning of a three-year projection horizon (2015-2017)4, 
would rapidly pass through to the inflation rate, prompting a fall of 
0.4  pp in the HICP in the first year, which would continue in 
subsequent years (see accompanying table). In terms of activity, 
the greatest effects would be felt in household spending 
(consumption and residential investment) as a result of the positive 
impact on their disposable income and wealth in real terms. In 
turn, higher spending would encourage private productive 
investment and employment. An increase in domestic demand 
would have an expansionary effect on imports, which would 
trigger a fall in the external sector’s contribution to GDP growth. 
Nevertheless, the decline in the energy bill would, in net terms, 
improve the economy’s net lending position. The second-round 
effects on prices and wages, according to this model’s estimates, 
are very moderate, owing, on one hand, to the degree of nominal 
rigidity inherent in the model and, on the other, to the effect of 
higher employment, which causes the decrease in inflation to have 
a small impact on wages. Overall, for this fall of 10% in oil prices, 
the model estimates that GDP would increase by 0.15 pp in the 
first year and by a further 0.04 pp in the second and third year, 
making for a cumulative increase of 0.23 pp over three years.
The above estimated impacts are of the sign expected under 
normal circumstances, considering that the Spanish economy is 
highly dependent on imported crude oil. However, these estimates 
should be interpreted with a degree of caution, insofar as the 
MTBE does not consider certain factors specific to the current 
economic situation which, might otherwise condition the sign of 
the effect of lower oil prices on economic activity. One of these 
specific factors is the role of the monetary policy of the ECB, 
which is currently deploying several non-standard measures in a 
setting where benchmark interest rates have reached levels close 
to their lower bound (see Chapter 2 of this report).
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT OF LOWER OIL PRICES ON GROWTH AND INFLATION IN SPAIN
2015 2016 2017
GDP 0.15 0.19 0.23
Contributions to real GDP growth
    Domestic demand 0.12 0.18 0.24
    Net exports -0.04 -0.07 -0.09
Net lending position 0.10 0.09 0.08
HICP -0.40 -0.41 -0.42
Wages -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Employment 0.19 0.25 0.31
Accumulated level differences
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
FALL OF 10% IN OIL PRICES  
1  See S. Hurtado, P. Manzano, E. Ortega and A. Urtasun (2014), Update 
and re-estimation of the quarterly model of Banco de España (MTBE), 
Documentos Ocasionales, No 1403, Banco de España.
2  See O. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2015), Policies for a low-inflation 
environment in a monetary union, Documentos de Trabajo, Banco de 
España (forthcoming). See Box 4.1 of this chapter for a description of 
the main features of this model.
3  Thus, for example, the estimated direct effect on the overall HICP of a 
reduction of 10% in oil prices when oil is trading at €80/barrel is –0.4% 
(–3.4% on the energy component of the HICP), whereas if the starting 
level is €40/barrel the impact is –0.3% on the overall HICP and –2.5% on 
the energy component
4  Taking €65/barrel as the starting level for oil prices, which would be the 
average of the previous quarters.
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Certain recent papers have argued that, where nominal rates are 
constrained by the zero bound5, a fall in oil prices might not be 
expansionary since its deflationary effect could prompt rises in 
real interest rates which limit short-term domestic demand. 
However, this literature has omitted the potential role of non-
standard policies which entail a reduction in the expected path of 
interest rates. Accordingly, presented below are the effects which 
would be produced by a shock, similar to a fall in oil prices, in the 
model [Arce, Hurtado and Thomas  (2015)] comprising two 
regions in a monetary union. Specifically, the effects of a supply-
side shock are considered which causes inflation to fall and 
increases real household disposable income in three different 
scenarios (see accompanying panel): (i) where the shock occurs 
when interest rates are far removed from the lower bound (blue 
line); (ii) where nominal interest rates are constrained at the lower 
bound (red line), and (iii) where rates are at the lower bound but 
the central bank applies non-standard monetary policy to reduce 
long-term nominal interest rates (for example, by managing the 
size and composition of its balance sheet or by guiding 
expectations) (green line).
As shown in the panel, the model concludes that a shock of this type 
would trigger a fall in inflation in the three scenarios6. However, the 
monetary policy response, which varies in the different cases, has 
significant effects on the response of inflation and GDP. First, where 
interest rates are clearly above the lower bound, the fall in inflation 
leads the monetary authority to cut nominal rates substantially and, 
consequently, real interest rates moderate and GDP responds 
positively. By contrast, in the second scenario, it is considered that 
nominal interest rates are restricted by the lower bound and lower 
inflation, in the absence of a counterbalancing response by nominal 
rates, which pushes real interest rates higher, giving rise to an impact 
of a contraction in GDP. In this case, although the medium and long-
term effect continues to be positive, GDP declines during the first 
two or three quarters.
As highlighted in the latter scenario, the previous short-term 
contractionary effect of the moderation in oil prices might be mitigated 
largely where the monetary authority responds to a fall in short-term 
inflation (and lower medium-term expectations) with a non-standard 
policy of managing its balance sheet and providing forward guidance, 
which keeps interest rates at their lower bound for longer than the 
rules governing their usual behaviour would suggest. In short, this 
central bank policy affects agents’ expectations and neutralises the 
contractionary effect of a fall in oil prices which, in fact, becomes 
slightly expansionary from as early as the initial quarters.
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT OF LOWER OIL PRICES ON GROWTH AND INFLATION IN SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
MARGINAL IMPACT OF A FALL IN OIL PRICES 
% deviations from scenario with no change in oil prices. % difference (vertical axis), year (horizontal access). 
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5  See, for example, S. Neri and A. Notarprieto (2014), Inflation, debt and 
the zero lower bound, Occasional Paper No 242, Banca de Italia, 
I.  Fisher (1933), “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions”, 
Econometrica, B. Bernanke (2007), “Inflation expectations and inflation 
forecasting”, in his speech at the NBER Summer Institute of July 2007 
and D. Laxton, P. N’Dyiage and P. Pesenti (2006), “Deflationary shocks 
and monetary policy rules: an open-economy scenario analysis”, Journal 
of the Japanese and International Economies.
6  The panel shows the responses of economy A in the two-region model, 
which is in a deleveraging phase. The responses of region B are 
qualitatively similar.
Creditless recoveries are generally defined as periods when GDP 
grows in real terms after a recession and the aggregate stock of 
credit to the private sector contracts. The literature on these 
episodes, which originated with the seminal work by Calvo et al. 
(2006),1 shows that they are not rare, since they affect between 
20% and 25% of all economic recoveries [Abiad et al. (2011),2 
Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013),3 Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus 
(2011)4] and, although they are more frequent in emerging 
economies, they also occur in developed ones [Claessens et al. 
(2009),5 Coricelli and Roland (2011)6]. Examples of creditless 
recoveries in developed countries include those that followed the 
Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States or the Nordic 
banking crises of the early 1990s.
The works cited identified certain factors that significantly increase 
the probability of a creditless recovery. These include, in particular, 
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BOX 5.1CREDITLESS RECOVERIES
1  G. Calvo, A. Izquierdo and E. Talvi (2006), “Sudden Stops and Phoenix 
Miracles in Emerging Markets”, American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings, vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 405-410.
2  A. Abiad, G. Dell’Ariccia and B. Li (2011), Creditless Recoveries, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/58.
3  N. Sugawara and J. Zalduendo (2013), Creditless Recoveries. Neither a 
Rare nor an Insurmountable Challenge, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 6459.
4  M. Bijsterbosch and T. Dahlhaus (2011), Determinants of Creditless 
Recoveries, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1358. 
5  S. Claessens, M. A. Kose and M. E. Terrones (2009), “A recovery without 
credit: possible, but…”, VoxEU.org, 22 May 2009.
6  F. Coricelli and I. Roland (2011), How do Credit Conditions Shape 
Economic Recoveries? CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 8325.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The data correspond to Finland (1990-96), Japan (1990-96), Norway (1988-94), Spain (1981-87) and Sweden (1990-96). Source: M. Biggs, T. Mayer and A. Pick 
(2010), Credit and Economic Recovery: Demystifying Phoenix Miracles, mimeo.
b Arithmetical mean of the volume indices of private consumption and investment of Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden, with base 100 at the minimum 
point of the series.
c Arithmetical mean of the stock of credit of Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden, with base 100 at the minimum point of their corresponding consumption 
and investment series.
d Annual change in the stock of credit index of Panel 1.
e Sum of the volume indices of private consumption and investment, with base 100 at the minimum point of the series.
f Base 100 at the minimum point of the consumption and investment series. The series includes the securitisation vehicles and loans transferred to Sareb and is 
@CITRSDCENQBG@MFDRMNSKHMJDCSNjM@MBH@KkNVRRTBG@RU@KT@SHNMDEEDBSR@MCKN@MVQHSDNEER
g Annual change in the stock of credit index of Panel 3.
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that the recovery follows a recession that was accompanied by a 
banking crisis and was preceded by a major credit surge.7 
Separately, these two factors also raise the probability significantly, 
along with other factors such as high private sector debt, a 
housing market slump or an exchange rate crisis. In addition, 
economies that are highly reliant on flows of foreign capital are 
more susceptible to creditless recoveries. Lastly, expansionary tax 
policies increase the incidence of these episodes, while 
expansionary monetary policies reduce it.
There are several factors that set creditless recoveries apart. One 
such factor is significantly lower GDP growth,8 especially in the 
first two years [Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013)]. As a result, and 
since creditless recoveries are usually preceded by deeper 
recessions, it takes longer to return to potential output levels. The 
growth breakdown is also different. In turn, domestic demand 
grows at a slower pace, although no differences are observed in 
the contribution of foreign demand relative to with-credit 
recoveries. The most dynamic component of domestic demand is 
generally consumption, while investment — especially non-
residential investment — takes longer to recover. On the supply 
side, the contributions of capital and productivity are much lower 
than in with-credit recoveries, while there is no difference in 
employment. In the breakdown by sector, growth is lower in 
sectors that are more reliant on external financing [Abiad et al. 
(2011), IMF (2009)9] and higher in sectors that are reliant on trade 
credit rather than bank credit [Coricelli and Roland (2011)]. This 
finding, together with the observation that creditless recoveries 
are much more frequent after banking crises, leads Coricelli and 
Roland (2011) to argue that these episodes are, at least partially, a 
consequence of deterioration in the supply of bank credit. 
Accordingly, they argue, policies designed to restore efficient 
financial intermediation should generate higher growth. The 
IMF  (2009) and Kannan (2010)10 also suggest that credit supply 
constraints may have a significant impact on the strength of 
recoveries.
Various explanations for creditless recoveries have been proposed 
in the literature. Calvo et al. (2006) argue that using the economic 
slack that has built up during a crisis may boost output with no 
need for higher investment and, therefore, for credit. According to 
the IMF (2009) and Darvas (2013),11 higher foreign demand and 
depreciation of the real exchange rate are both factors that can 
play a prominent role in creditless recoveries, allowing export 
companies to fund their business growth out of higher sales 
revenues. Claessens et al. (2009) and Coricelli and Roland (2011) 
suggest that in creditless recoveries sources of funding other than 
bank loans (trade credit, bonds, internal financing) may be used to 
fund private sector spending. These same authors indicate that a 
reallocation of credit to less credit-intensive and more productive 
sectors can generate economic growth even in a setting of private-
sector deleveraging on the back of productivity gains.
In turn, Biggs et al. (2010)12 highlight that in economic recoveries, 
changes in the flow of credit play a more important role than 
growth in the stock of credit, because the former are a better proxy 
of new credit, which is that used to fund consumption and 
investment growth. Specifically, the authors show that an increase 
in the net flow of credit (which may even be negative) alone is 
sufficient to trigger domestic demand growth. They illustrate this 
argument by analysing the main creditless recoveries that followed 
banking crises in developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
Panels 1 and 2). Thus, although the stock of credit continued to 
decline in the two years after private domestic demand touched 
bottom, the net flow of credit – albeit still negative – began to 
recover as domestic demand increased. This is observed in the 
present cycle in Spain, although the cumulative contraction in 
credit has been more marked than in the average of the episodes 
depicted in Panels 1 and 2 (see Panels 3 and 4). Thus,  in 2014, 
when domestic demand first started to recover, the stock of credit 
held by households and firms continued to decline, but the net 
flow of credit rose. If the regularity observed in past banking crises 
is repeated in this case, the stock of private sector credit would 
not start to increase in Spain until end-2015.
BOX 5.1CREDITLESS RECOVERIES (cont’d)
 7  Probability of 80%, according to Abiad et al. (2011).
 8  According to Abiad et al. (2011), a third lower than in with-credit 
recoveries.
 9  IMF (2009), World Economic Outlook, April, Chapter 3.
10  P. Kannan (2010), Credit Conditions and Recoveries for Recessions 
Associated with Financial Crises, IMF Working Paper WP/10/83.
11  Z. Darvas (2013), Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, February 2013.
12  M. Biggs, T. Mayer and A. Pick (2010), Credit and Economic Recovery: 
Demystifying Phoenix Miracles, mimeo.
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The information contained in the Banco de España’s Central Credit 
Register (CCR) database permits a disaggregated analysis of 
recent changes in the supply of and demand for credit, and in 
access to credit, by non-financial corporations. The CCR compiles 
monthly individual information on the credit balances and credit 
situation of loans over €6,000 provided by all the credit institutions 
operating in Spain. The database also contains the requests for 
information that the institutions file with the CCR to ascertain the 
debt position of firms that apply to them for funding and with 
which they have no exposure (they receive this information 
automatically on firms with which they already have exposure). 
Using these information requests it is possible to identify a 
subgroup of firms that are seeking bank funding (only firms 
applying for loans to banks with which they do not already have 
loans). Moreover, by observing how their credit balances evolve, it 
is also possible to know if those firms actually obtain the funding.1 
Therefore, the number of requests may be used as a proxy variable 
for demand for credit, while the proportion of firms that obtain 
funding is a measure of access to credit which depends both on 
the lending standards applied by institutions and the credit quality 
of the firms applying for funding. Panels 1 to 4 depict both 
indicators, together with the number and volume of bank loans 
granted proxied by the growth in firms’ credit balances.
As Panel 1 shows, the onset of the crisis in 2008 was accompanied 
by a severe contraction in demand for credit by Spanish firms 
which lasted through to early 2013. However, by sector, the 
demand performance was not uniform either in terms of timing or 
intensity. Thus, while demand in construction and real estate 
services fell sharply between 2008 and end-2010, demand in all 
other sectors was virtually unchanged. Subsequently, loan 
applications gradually declined across the board, so that by end-
2013 the number of firms seeking funding was 60% and 16% 
below the pre-crisis levels in the real estate and other sectors, 
respectively. At the same time, the proportion of firms that applied 
for and obtained funding (with institutions with which they had no 
exposure) dropped markedly in 2008-09 and then fell more 
gradually thereafter, touching bottom in April 2013 at 36%, almost 
20 pp below the early 2008 level (see Panel 2). This was most likely 
the result of the tightening of credit supply conditions and of the 
institutions’ perception of deterioration of credit quality of the 
applicants. The drop in credit demand and in the proportion of 
successful loan applications resulted in a sharp decline in the 
volume of new lending (see Panels 3 and 4). Both these factors 
played a more important role in the real estate sector, triggering a 
more pronounced decline both in the proportion of corporations 
obtaining funding and in the volume of new lending.
From early 2013, the improved economic situation and 
macroeconomic outlook prompted a reversal in these patterns. 
Thus, the demand for credit by firms tended to recover, driven 
exclusively by non-real-estate firms, and the proportion of firms 
obtaining the requested funding tended to increase, in general, 
growing by some three percentage points from the 2013 low to 
approximately 40% in October 2014. In the real estate-related 
sector, the number of credit applications remained stable in the 
period, although a larger number of these applications for bank 
funding were successful. Lastly it should be noted that despite the 
improved access to credit and the growth in demand, the volume 
of new lending has barely risen, indicating that for the subgroup of 
firms analysed here more loans are being granted but for lower 
average amounts than in the past.
In order to ascertain the extent to which the recent recovery 
observed in the proportion of firms obtaining funding reflects a 
genuine improvement in access to credit or changes in the 
characteristics of the corporations concerned, the probability of a 
firm being granted a loan has been modelled as a function of a 
series of firm-specific variables and a set of fixed effects2 and also 
permitting time-varying coefficients by sub-period (see Table 5). In 
particular three sub-periods are considered: the expansionary 
phase (2003-07), the crisis (2008-12) and the recovery (2013-14). 
In general, the estimated coefficients of the variables have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. Thus, as the table 
shows, the debt ratio, the interest burden and the fact that a firm 
has an NPL balance with a bank in the month previous to the loan 
application all have a negative effect on the probability of it 
obtaining funding from a bank with which it has no previous 
lending ties. Also according to the estimates, and counter-
intuitively, the asset volume of a firm has an adverse effect on the 
probability of it obtaining a loan, which may be linked to a possible 
bias in the sample of firms used in the estimations.3 Analysis of the 
findings by sub-period shows that after the crisis the probability of 
obtaining a loan became more sensitive to changes in financial 
determinants of firms, which suggests that institutions would be 
discriminating between firms to a greater extent than in the 
expansionary phase.
Lastly, Panel 6 shows the different probabilities of obtaining a loan 
by type of corporation: 1) the median firm, which proxies a typical 
firm; 2)  firms with a sounder financial position; 3)  firms with a 
BOX 5.2ACCESS TO CREDIT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN
1  More specifically, a firm is considered to have obtained funding when 
its credit balance (including both the amount drawable and the 
amount drawn) increases between t-1 and t+3 with banks with which 
it had no exposure.
2  The estimates derive from a linear probability model that includes as 
explanatory variables asset size, a binary variable that indicates 
whether the firm has an NPL balance, the logarithm of 1 plus the age 
in years of the firm, the debt ratio and the interest burden ratio. It also 
includes fixed firm effects, fixed year effects and fixed time effects 
combined with an age binary variable. The estimates were made for 
the subgroup of firms in the CCR for which there is information at the 
Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO). The data cover the period 
2003-14.
3  In particular, the CCR only identifies firms that apply for funding to 
institutions with which they have no exposure. One possible explanation 
for this result could be that the larger firms applying for loans from 
institutions with which they have no exposure are precisely those whose 
usual banks have refused to grant them funding in view of their perceived 
poor credit quality.
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BOX 5.2ACCESS TO CREDIT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2014
NPL -0.111* -0.133* -0.132*
Debt -0.053* -0.073* -0.073*
Interest burden -0.002* -0.005* -0.005*
Assets -0.062* -0.052* -0.046*
Age -0.002 0.014 0.009
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c (*) Indicates coefjcient signijcance at 1% conjdence level.   
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weaker financial position;4 and 4) new firms.5 The results show that 
the deterioration in access to credit was similar for new and 
established firms in the period 2007-10, whereas in 2011-12 the 
tightening continued for new firms but remained unchanged for 
established ones. Since then access to credit has improved, 
especially for new firms, returning even to pre-crisis levels, 
although this finding should be viewed with caution as the 
coefficient associated with this effect cannot be measured 
precisely. In turn, in terms of financial position, the panel shows 
how the probability of obtaining a loan during the crisis declined 
more severely for firms with higher debt and a higher interest 
burden and how, since 2012, that probability is recovering at a 
slower pace than for firms with a better financial position. Thus for 
this last group, in accordance with the results of the estimates, by 
2014 the probability of obtaining a loan had returned to pre-crisis 
levels, whereas in the case of firms with a weaker financial position 
it was still very much below those levels. In any event, all these 
results must be viewed with caution as they are based on 
estimates.
BOX 5.2ACCESS TO CREDIT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
4  To calculate the probability of firms with a weaker and a sounder financial 
position obtaining a loan, the value of the 90th and 10th percentiles, 
respectively, of the interest burden and the debt ratio are taken and the 
median for the other variables.
5  New firms are considered to be those that are two years old or less. The 
median value of the other variables is taken to calculate the probability.
